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Science and civil society in Japan: 
Physicists as public men and policymakers 
BEGINNING OVER FIFTY years ago, with the dropping of the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, Japanese physicists struggled to establish a type of civil society. They 
turned to science as a form of world culture, a way to transcend nationalism and 
bond with colleagues abroad. Many were to prove influential as public men and 
policymakers. They became engrossed in rebuilding their country, acting as social 
spokespersons, experts, technocrats, and international men of science. Foremost 
in their thoughts were the desire for professional autonomy, the commitment to 
democratic representation, and the notion that science would solve the nation's 
ills. But others, notably politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, had plans 
for Japan as well, which often differed from the scientists' . This paper outlines the 
interrelationship and conflict among physicists and these groups in their attempt to 
direct science for the "public good." Now with the end of the Cold War and in 
creasing globalization, political change is occurring throughout East Asia and ob 
jectives of the Japanese physicists are becoming a reality. 
Introduction 
In the late 1990s, Japan's failure to separate its business community, its bu 
reaucracy, and the political system was considered by many to be at the heart of 
the country's economic problems. It is only now, at the end of the twentieth cen 
tury, that changes are being made in new legislation and reorganization of the 
bureaucracy.1 Non-governmental organizations have become increasingly impor 
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1. For details see Morris Low, Shigeru Nakayama, and Hitoshi Yoshioka, Science, technol 
ogy and society in contemporary Japan (Cambridge, U.K., 1999). 
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tant in helping to bring about social change. But these voices of civil society have 
only had a short history.2 In the period immediately after World War II, it was 
arguably scientists, especially physicists, who provided new and contentious ideas, 
calling for change and greater public participation in policymaking. They assisted 
Japan in re-entering the international community through the world of science and 
in making the transition to a civil society. Despite the fact that almost all were 
employed by the state, the physicists considered their status as being closer to that 
of non-state actors, and they believed that they could provide independent, objec 
tive advice to the public. It was they who, through their high profile, helped de 
velop and circulate these ideas in the broader society. They were clearly men 
before their time. 
Shin'ichi Yoshida interprets civil society as "a spontaneous, concerned group 
of citizens who interact independently of government, while collaborating with it 
at certain times and opposing it at others."3 Likewise if we define the term as 
David Holloway has, in the self-organization of autonomous groups to balance the 
power of the state, physicists were a major force in Japan in the struggle for civil 
society and the maintenance of a public sphere.4 What prompted Japanese physi 
cists as individuals and as a group to speak out and seek a better society? It is 
difficult to pinpoint any one common feature apart from their science. Nonethe 
less, while their experiences, attitudes, and beliefs varied, their interest in science 
policy tended to lie in basic rather than applied research, in the regulation rather 
than the promotion of the commercialization of science, and in science as a vehicle 
for a more international Japan. United by class, education, and mental ability, they 
articulated their ambitions to direct Japan's research effort by speaking of the ben 
efits of science, democracy, internationalism, and the public good. A measure of 
their success can be seen in the many research institutes established through the 
Science Council and in scientists' participation in various policymaking bodies. 
The complex decision-making structure that emerged reflects the efforts of physi 
cists to assert their professional expertise and social responsibility against the po 
litical authority of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureau 
cracy, and big business. In order to gain some sense of how Japanese physicists 
were active as public men and policymakers, this paper outlines the lives of seven 
of Japan's most prominent physicists: Yoshio Nishina, Shoichi Sakata, Mituo 
Taketani, Hideki Yukawa, Sin-itiro Tomonaga, Ryokichi Sagane, and Satio 
2. Clifford Chanin, "Voice of the people: The development of NGOs in Japan," paper 
presented at "Civil society in Japan (and America): Coping with change" (Washington, 
D.C., 1998). 
3. Shin'ichi Yoshida, "Rethinking the public interest in Japan: Civil society in the making," 
in Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Deciding the public good: Governance and civil society in Ja 
pan (Tokyo, 1999), 13-49, esp. 14. 
4. David Holloway, "Physics, the state, and civil society in the Soviet Union," in this 
volume. 
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Hayakawa. Brief biographies will be interwoven with accounts of their different 
approaches to science, and the institutions with which they were involved. 
The emergence of physics in Japan 
Educated people took up science in nineteenth-century Japan in a manner remi 
niscent of the samurai pursuit of learning, serving to bond science with the public 
sphere and to establish the notion of science in service to the state. The Japanese 
created the institutional structures necessary for transmitting science before the 
scholars and students were in place. Bartholomew suggests that in the seventeenth 
century commoners mainly accounted for the activity in the physical sciences, 
such as astronomy and calendrical studies, while by the mid-eighteenth century 
samurai had become the dominant group. He argues that there might well have 
been a scientific revolution in Japan, had it not been for the social division of 
knowledge that prevented a late eighteenth-century marriage of mathematical skills 
(the domain of relatively lower status groups) with the more prestigious physics 
and astronomy (in which samurai were taking an interest).5 Andrew Barshay has 
further written of the emergence of a "public" sphere in the Meiji period (1868 
1912), which produced the intellectuals he refers to as "public men." This public 
sphere went beyond official and private activities. While "publicness" related to 
public activity, "insiders" (with links to large organizations) were viewed more 
highly than "outsiders" (dissidents and independents). "Public" thus came to be 
viewed as being associated with the state, and the intellectual elite of both persua 
sions derived their status from their position as experts in their chosen areas of 
imported knowledge.6 
Both Bartholomew7 and Nakayama8 have examined how Germany was pro 
moted as an academic model at this time, one of the many organizational models 
that Japan introduced during the Meiji period.9 Interest in German scholarship 
intensified in the 1880s; Japanese scientists studying in Europe gravitated towards 
Germany and government ministers looked to German higher education as a model. 
It would only be after World War II that the American style of graduate school 
education would have an impact.10 
5. James R. Bartholomew, "Why was there no scientific revolution in Tokugawa Japan?," 
Japanese studies in the history of science, 15 (1976), 111-125. 
6. Andrew E. Barshay, State and intellectual in imperial Japan: The public man in crisis 
(Berkeley, 1988), xiii, 24. 
7. James R. Bartholomew, The formation of science in Japan: Building a research tradition 
(New Haven, 1989), 133. 
8. Shigeru Nakayama, Teikoku daigaku no tanjo (The birth of imperial universities) (To 
kyo, 1978), esp. 34-71. 
9. For details of this process, see D.E. Westney, Imitation and innovation: The transfer of 
Western organizational patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, 1987). 
10. Shigeru Nakayama, trans. Jerry Dusenbury, Academic and scientific traditions in China, 
Japan and the West (Tokyo, 1984), 219-220. 
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Bartholomew has also remarked on how education and research in the physi 
cal sciences in the Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1926) periods were reliant 
on the public sector. Scientists, as a result, were considered government officials. 
Most physicists tended to have a samurai background, and almost all went on to 
become professors. Confucian-trained officials had greater access than other Japa 
nese to the physical sciences, activity in the field focused on Tokyo, and Japanese 
physicists were likely to take up positions as university professors and rely on 
government support for their activities.11 This required Japanese physicists to con 
tinually confront the problem of balancing a desire for professional autonomy with 
the demands of the nation. By the 1930s, however, the professorial "chair" system 
had become unwieldy, preventing students and scholars from performing collabo 
rative work of both civilian and military nature. 
Institutional developments were underway. In 1877, the Tokyo Mathematical 
Society was established and became known as the Tokyo Mathematico-Physical 
Society (Tokyo Sugaku Butsuri Gakkai) in 1884. Kenjiro Yamagawa became the 
first Japanese professor of physics at the University of Tokyo in 1879. By the turn 
of the century, Kyoto Imperial University and Tohoku Imperial University were 
also educating physicists,12 with^the Tokyo Imperial University producing over 
100 physics graduates by 1900. Until 1918, when the Ministry of Education began 
providing grants for scientific research, Japanese physicists tended to pursue theo 
retical rather than experimental topics. During and after World War I, a number of 
research facilities were then established. In Tokyo the Institute of Physical and 
Chemical Research (abbreviated in Japanese as "Riken") was the largest pre-World 
War II scientific research organization in Japan, analogous to the Imperial Institute 
of Physics and Technology in Germany (established in 1887).13 Formed in 1917 
with funds from government and the private sector, Riken provided relief to the 
inefficiencies of the university system and established a model for later common 
use research institutes. Until at least 1921, it was divided into two divisions, phys 
ics and chemistry, and beginning in 1922 a laboratory system was established. 
Many of its researchers were affiliated with major universities but found Riken 
attractive because of the research opportunities. Despite the vigor of research at 
Riken, the formal teaching of physics occurred at the seven imperial universities: 
Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Tohoku. By 1940, the 
number of university science graduates was double that in the first year of the 
Showa period, 1926. Five years later it would be over double that again. Between 
1931 and 1940 it was estimated that around 1159 doctorates in science, technol 
ogy, agriculture, and forestry were awarded in Japan.14 
11. James R. Bartholomew, "The Japanese scientific community in formation, 1870-1920: 
Part 1," Journal of Asian affairs, 5:1 (1980), 62-84. 
12. Hiro Tawara, Pioneers of physics in the early days of Japan (Amsterdam, 1989), 57-58. 
13. David Cahan, An institute for an empire: The Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, 
1871-1918 (Cambridge, 1989). 
14. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Japanese natural 
resources: A comprehensive survey (Tokyo, 1949), 506. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 09 Oct 2015 04:42:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JAPANESE PHYSICISTS 197 
Yoshio Nishina 
Riken attracted many promising young researchers, many of whom worked 
towards a doctoral degree there. One of them was Yoshio Nishina, one of Japan's 
most important physicists. Indeed, Nishina never occupied an academic post in a 
university, but was instead attached to the autonomous research institution that 
was Riken. Nishina was born on December 6, 1890, into a privileged family with 
a tradition of public service, in the southwestern part of Okayama prefecture. His 
ancestors had held the position of "daikan" ("local officials") who performed tasks 
of a financial nature for feudal domains. In 1914, Nishina entered the Department 
of Electrical Engineering in the School of Engineering of Tokyo Imperial Univer 
sity, graduating top in his field in 1918. Thereupon Nishina entered the newly 
established Riken as a research student, and, soon afterwards, entered graduate 
school where he chose to study physics and mathematics. In 1921 he went to Eu 
rope as a Riken "kaigai ryu gakusei" ("overseas student"), first studying with Ernest 
Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University, then at Gottingen 
University from November 1922 until March 1923. He subsequently spent about 
five years (April 10, 1923-September 30, 1928) with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, 
for a total of seven years in Europe. At Copenhagen, Nishina co-authored a fa 
mous theoretical paper with Oskar Klein on the rate and angular distribution of 
Compton scattering. 
Upon his return to Japan, Nishina was given a position in the Hantaro Nagaoka 
laboratory at Riken. In 1930 Nishina obtained his Doctor of Science degree.15 In 
May 1931, he gave a series of intensive lectures on quantum mechanics at Kyoto 
University which would be attended by a number of budding physicists, including 
Hideki Yukawa, Sin-itiro Tomonaga, Shoichi Sakata, and Minoru Kobayashi. 
Shortly afterwards, on July 1, Nishina was appointed a chief researcher at Riken 
with strong backing from Nagaoka. Nishina was the youngest person to hold this 
position, which came complete (in 1932) with his own laboratory. Early members 
of Nishina's laboratory were Masa Takeuchi, Sin-itiro Tomonaga, and Hantaro 
Nagaoka's son, Ryokichi Sagane.16 
In 1931, scientists called for an increase in government funding of research. 
The government contributed to Riken 250,000 yen (equivalent to U.S. $125,000),17 
whereas the overall research funding provided by the Ministry of Education for 
the natural sciences in Japan was a measly 60,000 yen, or around U.S. $30,000. 
15. Shimpei Miyata, Kagakushatachi no jiyu na rakuen: Koei no Rikagaku Kenkyujo (The 
scientists'paradise: The famous Institute of Physical and Chemical Research) (Tokyo, 1983), 
186. 
16. "Nishina kenkyushitsu no hassoku" ("The establishment of the Nishina Laboratory"), 
Mugendai, 85 (Fall 1990), 46. 
17. This is based on an exchange rate of 2 yen per U.S. dollar. After 1931, the yen was 
devalued, with a new rate of about 4 yen per U.S. dollar remaining in place for the rest of 
the 1930s. From Al Alletzhauser, The house of Nomura (London, 1990), Appen. 6. 
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The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai) was 
established in December 1932 to provide further support. Matters were helped 
along when interest in nuclear physics increased dramatically in Japan in 1934. 
The neutron and positron had been discovered in 1932, and Nishina used cosmic 
rays and the military potential of physics research as a fund-raising argument.18 In 
1935, plans were laid for a new laboratory at Riken to be equipped with a Cockcroft 
Walton apparatus and a cyclotron, and the Nishina laboratory took charge of the 
cyclotron project. In mid-1935 Nishina arranged with Ernest Lawrence for Sagahe 
to go to Berkeley where he served a short apprenticeship in the fine art of cyclo 
tron-making. Nishina completed his cyclotron in April 1937, a machine boasted 
as being second in workmanship only to that of Lawrence's. Thus, with help from 
Lawrence and Sagane, Nishina became Japan's expert on things nuclear. It is there 
fore not surprising that the military would turn to Nishina when canvassing the 
idea of an atomic bomb. Whereas elite scholars had previously employed the 
public discourses of Confucianism, Meiji modernization, and self-sufficiency, it 
was up to budding public men such as Yoshio Nishina to invent a new vocabulary. 
Nishina co-opted state discourses relating to Japan's war effort, participating in 
Japan's atomic bomb project and encouraging students to participate in radar and 
"death ray" research.19 He ingratiated himself with the military to protect his own 
agenda and to sustain the research careers of his students. 
Thus in the early 1940s Japanese physicists studied the theory of chain reac 
tions and conducted experiments to determine the neutron capture cross-section of 
uranium 235. Attempts were made to construct apparatus to separate uranium iso 
topes by thermal diffusion and by centrifuge, but the physicists came to the con 
clusion that it would be impossible to produce the atomic bomb during the war.20 
Japanese physicists also busied themselves with the development of meson theory. 
In 1949 Yukawa became the first Japanese Nobel laureate for his work in theoreti 
cal physics, part of which he carried out during the war; in 1965 Tomonaga re 
ceived the Nobel Prize for his contribution to elementary particle physics, again 
for work which evolved partly during the war. 
Building cyclotrons required Nishina to project a public face, perhaps not at 
one with his shy character, but essential to mobilize the necessary resources and 
personnel for American-style big science.21 This projection allowed Nishina to 
18. Tetu Hirosige, Kagaku to rekishi (Science and history) (Tokyo, 1970, 1980), 228. 
19. See Morris F. Low, "The useful war: Radar and the mobilization of science and industry 
in Japan," in Roy M. MacLeod, ed., Science and the Pacific War (Lancaster, U.K., in press); 
Yutaka Kawamura and Masakatsu Yamazaki, "Butsuri Kondankai to Kyu-Nihon Kaigun ni 
okeru kaku oyobi kyoryoku magunetoron kaihatsu" ("The Physics Committee and the former 
Japanese Navy's project for the development of atomic energy and a powerful magnetron 
during the Second World War"), Kagakushi kenkyu, 37:207 (1998), 163-171. 
20. Charles Weiner, "Retroactive saber rattling? A note on nuclear physics in Japan," Bul 
letin of the atomic scientists, 34:4 (Apr 1978), 10-12. 
21. Morris F. Low, "Japan's secret war? 'Instant' scientific manpower and Japan's World 
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influence science policy and Japan's reconstruction after World War II, but new 
beginnings required a new rhetoric, even if the call was once again to mobilize 
science and technology for the nation's good. 
While Nishina worked with the state, he nevertheless urged scientific workers 
to organize themselves for political action and to help solve Japan's grave eco 
nomic condition. He set the stage for the identification of physicists as "experts" 
who could solve social problems via the scientific method. While they might be 
employed by the state via the universities where many of them worked, many felt 
that they possessed know-how that was perceived as going beyond narrow nation 
alisms. They saw this expertise as helping Japan to enter a world culture of sci 
ence. Although the physicists differed in their philosophical beliefs, they converged 
in their conviction that science would lead the Japanese to a better world. While 
this attitude might be described as a scientistic ideology, this belief, common to 
many scientists throughout the world, informed their lives and actions. 
The rise of the public man 
Resourceful physicists such as Nishina were public men who co-opted state 
discourses relating to Japan's war effort and postwar democracy to further their 
own aims. Elite scientists in universities have continued to operate in Japanese 
society somewhat removed from the mainstream, away from the everyday pres 
sure of development at all costs. While institutions like the strong bureaucracy, the 
former zaibatsu (business conglomerates), and the banking system have been more 
geared to achieving high economic growth,22 scientists, who were rooted in a largely 
Western tradition, have championed European-inspired goals for science and served 
as a moderating force. Their efforts to bring about social change and to create a 
society more oriented to encouraging individual creativity have led to conflict. 
J.A.A. Stockwin argues that the three decades following Japan's defeat in 1945 
were a period of national renewal on a par with the Meiji period. Why had the 
latter been so important, and what does the comparison teach us? The Meiji Resto 
ration of 1868 had marked the transition in Japan from feudal government under 
the ruling Tokugawa family to a new political system placing the Emperor at the 
center. In 1889 the Meiji Constitution had been introduced, setting up a state on 
the Western model. A parliament known as the Imperial Diet had been established, 
consisting of a House of Peers and an elected House of Representatives. Whereas 
in the 1890s only about one per cent of the population could vote, in 1925 univer 
War II atomic bomb project," Annals of science, 47:4 (1990), 347-360; R.W. Home and 
Morris F. Low, "Postwar scientific intelligence missions to Japan," Isis, 84 (1993), 527 
537; John Dower, Japan in war and peace: Essays on history, culture and race (London, 
1995), 55-100. 
22. Chalmers Johnson, M.LT.L and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 
1925-1975 (Stanford, 1982), 307. 
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sal male suffrage had been introduced. Ironically, intolerance of political dissent 
had grown: the 1930s had seen the rise of nationalism, the decline of party politics, 
and the increasing influence of the armed forces. In the lead-up to the Pacific War 
in 1941, strong ties had been forged between government and industry which would 
re-emerge in postwar Japan.23 
The Allied Occupation (1945-52) was of central importance to Japan's future. 
Under the cry of democratization, reforms were put into place which determined 
the country's postwar direction. In a book series entitled The twenty-year whirl 
wind: Exposing the inside story of the Showa period,24 the first volume of which 
was published four months after the surrender, a team of journalists developed the 
thesis that military leaders (especially in the army), along with right-wing ele 
ments, academics, some industrialists, and politicians were primarily responsible 
for Japan's defeat. These militarists were seen as having been irrational and unsci 
entific in the way they had waged war, the ultimate proof being their inability to 
understand Japan's backwardness in science and technology. Indeed many Japa 
nese believed that they had lost the war largely because of superior American 
know-how, as shown by the atomic bomb. As the historian John Dower argues in 
his important new book, science became at once both a reason for explaining Japan's 
defeat and a symbol of where Japan's future lay.25 
The Emperor was persuaded to renounce his divinity on January 1,1946. Hav 
ing become disenchanted with the manipulation of their emotions and beliefs dur 
ing the war, the Japanese embraced science and technology in the spiritual vacuum 
in the years that followed, and physicists were among their heroes. But the physi 
cists had other players to contend with, most notably politicians, bureaucrats, and 
big business. The purging of politicians and the military who had been involved in 
the war effort left a power vacuum that the bureaucrats filled.26 Moreover, the 
Allied Occupation effectively strengthened government ministries in order to carry 
out its reforms. In fact, until recently it has been difficult to make any changes to 
the bureaucratic structure that came into being in 1947. Major elements of this 
framework are shown in the figure below. 
President Truman and others argued that for science to flourish, "a spirit of 
freedom" was necessary.27 This attitude fueled calls by the scientific community 
in Japan for a more rational and democratic society in which scientists were promi 
nent. After the war, sovereignty no longer rested with the Emperor, but was lo 
23. J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan: Divided politics in a major economy, 3rd edn. 
(Oxford, 1999), 17-36. 
24. Shozo Mori, ed., Senpu nijunen: Kaikin Shuwa rimen shi (The twenty-year whirlwind: 
Exposing the inside story of the Showa period) (2 vols., Tokyo, 1945, 1946). Cited in John 
W. Dower, Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II (New York, 1999), 490. 
25. Dower (ibid.), 494. 
26. Stockwin (ref. 23), 43. 
27. Asahi shinbun, 14 Sep 1945. Cited in Dower (ref. 24), 495. 
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cated in the people. The House of Peers was replaced by an elected House of 
Councillors, and women were given the vote. The voting age was lowered from 
twenty-five to twenty, and in the name of democratization labor unions and other 
independent groups were encouraged to speak their mind. Nishina's call to scien 
tific workers reflected the new situation in which public men were no longer re 
quired to frame their views in terms of the interests of the state. Left-wing scien 
tists were actively encouraged to organize, freedom of thought being one of the 
civil liberties written into the postwar Constitution.28 The political structure estab 
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28. Stockwin (ref. 23), 38-40. 
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lished under the constitution (promulgated in 1946 and effective as of 1947) is 
reminiscent of the British "Westminster model": The electorate chooses members 
of parliament, and a government is formed by the majority of members. For the 
period from 1955 to 1993, a single party was consistently returned to power, the 
LDP.29 
In countries around the world, the end of the war gave rise to efforts to make 
better use of research for national and international objectives.30 Nishina, who had 
played a significant role in the mobilization of science during the war, was also 
important in the "remobilization" of science and technology afterwards. Occupa 
tion authorities sought to demobilize Japanese science, remobilize it to meet U.S. 
goals, and reorganize scientific bodies along more democratic lines. The proposal 
for a National Science Foundation in the U.S.A. was echoed in Japan, in the at 
tempts by the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) of the headquarters of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to set up a democratic sci 
ence policymaking structure. Towards the end of 1945, after initial investigations 
had ascertained there was no Japanese A-bomb, restrictions on Japanese nuclear 
physicists were relaxed, although prohibitions on research relating to atomic en 
ergy remained. The U.S. Army dispatched American physicists Gerald Fox and 
Harry Kelly to Japan to liaise with Japan's scientists. Kelly remained for four 
years in ESS, providing the Japanese physicists with a link to the outside scientific 
world and working with Nishina and others to mobilize science for Japan's post 
war reconstruction.31 
On March 12, 1946, Nishina took an initiative in calling for a representative 
organization for Japanese scientists along union lines, to fight to ensure scientists 
at least the minimum conditions for survival and help make them more politically 
aware. Given the linkage between democratic politics, party politics, and the views 
of the people, Nishina felt that political parties would determine the fate of science 
in the future.32 His message, published as an essay in the science magazine, Shizen 
(Nature) in May 1946, called for scientists to translate their authority into political 
clout through representation and participation in the policymaking process. 
29. Ibid., 95. 
30. Jean-Jacques Salomon, "Science policy studies and the development of science policy," 
in Ina Spiegel-Rosing and Derek de Solla Price, eds., Science, technology and society: A 
cross-disciplinary perspective (London, 1977), 43-70, esp. 48. 
31. The Japanese reforms "reflected the full range of the then American political spectrum: 
left, liberal, New Deal, mainline American, conservative, military." Herbert Passin, "The 
Occupation: Some reflections," Daedalus, 119:3 (Summer 1990), 107-29, on 114. See also 
Hideo Yoshikawa and Joanne Kauffman, Science has no national borders: Harry C. Kelly 
and the reconstruction of science in postwar Japan (Cambridge, 1994); Jessica Wang, "Lib 
erals, the progressive left, and the political economy of postwar American science: The 
National Science Foundation debate revisited," HSPS, 26:1 (1995), 139-166. 
32. Yoshio Nishina, "Nihon saiken to kagaku" ("Science and the reconstruction of Japan"), 
Shizen, 1 (May 1946), essay dated 12 Mar 1946, reprinted in Shizen, 300 (Mar 1971), 15-18, 
on 17, my translation. 
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Other steps were also under way between April and June 1946. The Japanese 
Association for Science Liaison (JASL) (Kagaku Shogai Renraku Iinkai) was 
formed as an advisory group to the Occupation. On October 28, Sagane suggested 
a similar group specifically for engineers, a body whose formation, as the Engi 
neering Liaison group, was underway by December.33 The JASL, whose forty 
members included Nishina, consisted of a network of regional branches at impe 
rial universities and was a forerunner of the Science Council of Japan. With a view 
to establishing the latter, a preparatory committee (Sewaninkai), consisting of forty 
four mainly Tokyo-based academics, was formed in January 1947. This commit 
tee was responsible for electing a representative Renewal Committee for Science 
Organization (Gakujutsu Taisei Sasshin Iinkai), upon whose deliberations, through 
March 1948, the Science Council of Japan would be established. The Renewal 
Committee, for its part, was to be made up of 108 members, with fifteen members 
each from basic natural science, engineering, medicine, agriculture, law, litera 
ture, and economics, and the remaining three forming a special "composite" cat 
egory representing broad interests. Progressive groups were active during the Re 
newal Committee election in 1947; eleven people considered communist sympa 
thizers were elected, two of whom belonged to the "composite" category and were 
members of the Democratic Scientists' Association (Minshushugi Kagakusha 
Kyokai or Minka, a body about which we will hear more below) and the Demo 
cratic Technologists' Association (Minshushugi Gijutsusha Kyokai). 
The government, fearful of a left-wing takeover of the Science Council, pro 
posed that that body should be independent: the government could seek the Council's 
advice but was not bound to do so, thus opening the gate for the government's 
"own" advisory bodies to be given preference. On July 5, 1948, the Diet approved 
the establishment of the Council, which would consist of 210 elected members, 
thirty from each of seven divisions: (1) literature, philosophy, and history; (2) law 
and politics; (3) economics and commerce; (4) fundamental science; (5) engineer 
ing; (6) agriculture; and (7) medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy. The "Science Coun 
cil," then, was more of a "Research Council," literally "Council for Scholarship"; 
but suffice it to say that physicists were prominent. Members were elected in 
December 1948, and Yoshio Nishina was chosen second vice-president at the in 
augural meeting on January 20, 1949.34 According to SCAP, approximately forty 
of the 210 representatives were known to be Communists or Communist sympa 
thizers. 
For their part, the Allied Occupation authorities made efforts to take advantage 
of research activities for Japan's benefit and America's own Asian agenda.35 SCAP 
33. Draft of "Summary of activities of Scientific and Technical Division in science reorga 
nization," GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (B) 11598. National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
34. For details of the voting see "Minutes of 1st general meeting of J.S.C., 20 January 1949 
at the Japan Academy Auditorium," GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (B) 11634. 
35. Bowen C. Dees, The Allied Occupation and Japan's economic miracle (Richmond, 
Surrey, 1997), 188-193. 
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thus encouraged the formation of the Japanese Association for Science Liaison, 
the Renewal Committee for Science Organization, and later the Science Council 
of Japan to centralize scientists and enhance monitoring of their actions. The emer 
gence of the Cold War suggested to I.I. Rabi that Japanese physicists could pro 
vide skilled manpower in time of war in the Far East.36 This idea meshed nicely 
with the perception that solutions to many of the problems that the Japanese were 
facing could be found in the U.S. 
Nishina, for his part, continued to play an important role in other ways. In July 
1946, as part of the dissolution of the zaibatsu (prewar business combines), Riken 
was reorganized, with Kelly and Nishina making great efforts to preserve it. Nishina 
was chosen to represent Riken, became its director, and in November 1946 was 
chosen as its new head. The language that Nishina used in the postwar period was 
one of peace, internationalism, democracy, and the scientific method. These were 
keywords in postwar Japan, forms of universalism for a country intent on rejoin 
ing the world. In September 1949, Nishina attended the general meeting of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions in Copenhagen as Science Council rep 
resentative and then went on to the General Assembly of UNESCO (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) in Paris in his capac 
ity as President of the Federation of UNESCO. Cooperative Associations in Japan. 
In late November 1950, he was taken ill with liver cancer and died on January 10, 
1951.37 
There are startling continuities between the wartime mobilization of science 
and the Occupation efforts to direct science for the reconstruction of Japan and an 
American Cold War agenda. Being under the U.S. security umbrella meant that 
Japan could focus on economic growth. Nishina responded well to the change in 
authority after the Pacific War, maintaining a high public profile and continuing to 
appeal to the public good. He suppressed his interest in basic research and pro 
posed that physicists respond first to the practical needs of the nation. His sense of 
priorities was not shared by all. Nishina's greatest legacy was in fact the many 
students he nurtured who would go on to lead the scientific community and be 
influential in policymaking. Unlike him, most would hold university positions. 
This generation of physicists would struggle with the tensions of being employees 
of the state and working with the state to implement policy, and yet claiming to 
provide independent advice in the interests of the Japanese people. 
Shoichi Sakata and Mituo Taketani 
Many scientists hoped that the Science Council would be the central organiza 
tion for science and technology in Japan. The two physicists Shoichi Sakata and 
36. This is discussed in both Shigeru Nakayama, Science, technology and society in Japan 
(London, 1991), 117-119; and Dees (ibid.). 
37. Fumio Yamazaki, "A short biography of Dr. Yoshio Nishina," in Sin-itiro Tomonaga 
and Hidehiko Tamaki, eds., Nishina Yoshio: Denki to kaiso (Yoshio Nishina: Biography and 
reminiscences) (Tokyo, 1952), 3-15, esp. 14. 
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Mituo Taketani considered the new-found democracy to be an opportunity to em 
power scientific workers to influence their research environment and work for the 
people. Sakata and Taketani argued for research autonomy and a commitment to 
basic science. Despite great differences in family background both shared an inter 
est in Marxism and were outspoken regarding the need for science and democracy 
in "modernizing" Japan. Both physicists promoted scientism and equated recon 
struction with a type of revolution: society had to be changed to allow science to 
become a force for social change. Despite the more liberal postwar political envi 
ronment, the Occupation Forces saw to it that left-wing physicists such as Sakata 
and Taketani were kept under surveillance and their research monitored. Why? 
The importance of nuclear expertise and the idea that physicists had the key to 
nuclear weapons and the world's future are not to be underestimated. In the first 
fifteen years after Japan's defeat, poor conditions encouraged many Japanese in 
their attraction to ideas like Sakata's and Taketani's. In the later period of eco 
nomic prosperity, by contrast, the Japanese became more optimistic and proved in 
less need of a revolution and less reliant on physicists. 
Shoichi Sakata was born on January 18, 1911, the eldest son of Mikita and 
Tatsue Sakata. He lived in the Prime Minister's residential compound in Tokyo, as 
Mikita, who had graduated from the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, 
was secretary to Prime Minister Taro Katsura. In March 1912, Mikita took up a 
new position in Fukuoka prefecture, but he returned to Tokyo as Secretary to the 
Minister for Commerce and Agriculture (1914) and Secretary to the Minister for 
Home Affairs (1915). He later went on to become governor of Ehime (1916) and 
Kagawa (1917) prefectures and mayor of Takamatsu city in 1919, retiring from 
politics in 1920.38 
Shoichi studied at Konan High School (1926-1929) during the early years of 
the Showa period. At Konan, he became close friends with Tadashi Kato, who in 
1929 translated (with Eijiro Kako) Engels' Dialectics of nature. After graduating 
from Konan, Sakata became an auditor student in the Department of Physics at 
Tokyo Imperial University and visited Nishina, a distant relative, who had returned 
from Copenhagen the year before. In April 1930, Sakata entered the Department 
of Physics at Kyoto Imperial University. In 1932, he chose nuclear theory as the 
subject of his graduation thesis, and in March 1933 he graduated, some four years 
after the physicists Yukawa and Tomonaga.39 Sakata then made his way to Nishina's 
laboratory at Riken, where he was first a research student and then an associate 
(April 1933-March 1934). There he worked with Tomonaga and befriended Mituo 
Taketani. After Riken, Sakata moved to Osaka Imperial University, where he worked 
with Yukawa on topics such as meson theory. In 1938 he was appointed lecturer. 
38. Shoichi Sakata, Kagakusha to shakai, ronshu (Scientists and society, collected pa 
pers), Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1972), 422-423. Shunkichi Hirokawa and Shuzo Ogawa, "Shoichi 
Sakata: His physics and methodology," Historia scientiarum, 36 (1989), 67-81, esp. 67. 
39. Sakata (ref. 38), 424. 
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Yukawa subsequently moved to Kyoto Imperial University, where Sakata also some 
times lectured.40 
In May 1941, Sakata received his Doctor of Science and almost one year later 
presented the two-meson theory with Yasutaka Tanikawa at Riken. Sakata then 
moved to Nagoya to become professor at the new imperial university. In April 
1945, the Nagoya theoretical physics group moved to Fushimi in Nagano prefec 
ture. During his spare time at Fushimi, Sakata read J.D. Bernal's The social func 
tion of science (1939), eventually co-translating the book into Japanese in 1951. 
To Sakata, it seemed a natural extension of Marxist thought. He was particularly 
impressed by Bernal's concept of "laboratory democracy,"41 for it offered a way of 
overcoming the dominant role of professors in Japan. His view of democracy in 
volved not only physicists but representation and participation by a much wider 
group of people. In this respect, he may well have been influenced by Taketani, 
who came from a less wealthy background. 
Taketani was born in 1911 in the city of Omuta in Fukuoka prefecture, the 
third son of a technical expert at the local Mitsui-owned Miike coal mine. The 
family moved to Osaka when he was six, his father working as an engineer at a 
nearby factory which was owned by an uncle. At the end of World War I, Taketani's 
father was forced to find a new job at a coal mine in the northern part of Taiwan. 
The family followed. Taketani eventually returned to Japan and entered the De 
partment of Geophysics in the Faculty of Science at Kyoto University. In his sec 
ond year, he switched to a physics major. Taketani graduated in 1934, with a final 
year thesis, later published, titled "How should we study nuclear physics?" In late 
1934, Taketani became involved in an intellectual group which would publish a 
journal entitled Sekai bunka (World culture) aimed at protecting anti-fascist cul 
ture. In the autumn of 1936, however, half the core members were rounded up by 
the Special Higher Police42 and interrogated. Taketani helped develop Yukawa's 
meson theory during 1937/8. In September 1938, however, Taketani was taken to 
Kyoto and detained, made to sign a statement that Sekai bunka supported the Japa 
nese Communist Party, and kept in detention until April 1939, when he was re 
leased with Yukawa acting as guarantor.43 
Beginning around April 1941, Taketani went to Tokyo to help Sin-itiro 
Tomonaga in Nishina's laboratory. The Nishina lab by this time included a cosmic 
ray experiment group, a cyclotron group, a theory group, and a biology group; 
Tomonaga was one of the leading members of the theory group, and Ryokichi 
Sagane was the core of the group working on the cyclotron. The Army-funded 
atomic bomb project began in 1943 and Taketani was mobilized for it. The aim 
was to separate uranium 235 by gaseous thermal diffusion. Taketani's work was 
40. Ibid., 424-425. 
41. J.D. Bernal, The social function of science (London, 1939), 267. 
42. For details of the activities of the Special Higher Police, see Elise K. Tipton, The 
Japanese police state: The Tokko in interwar Japan (North Sydney, 1990). 
43. Taketani, Shiso o oru {The interweaving of ideas) (Tokyo, 1985), 76-84. 
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interrupted in May 1944 when the Special Higher Police detained him for a second 
time.44 During his detention, Taketani worked on the theory of the thermal diffu 
sion process and also calculated the potential damage from an atomic bomb. He 
returned home in September 1944.45 With the end of the war, Taketani, along with 
Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, became one of Japan's best physicists?not so 
much for his physics, however, as for his role as a social spokesperson, organizer 
of the Elementary Particle Theory Group, and commentator on the social respon 
sibility of scientists.46 
After Japan's defeat, as we saw, there was much debate on how and for what 
purposes science might be put to use. Left-wing scientist-intellectuals such as Sakata 
and Taketani emphasized the need for a democratic administrative structure and 
the importance of working to improve the people's welfare. Socialism was por 
trayed as scientific and an aid in solving Japan's problems. Science, therefore, 
was of central importance, and scientists were not only to take social responsibil 
ity for it, but also to protect it from abuses by the state or private sector. Sakata 
felt, like Bernal, that society would need to change for science to prosper. 
The Democratic Scientists' Association (abbreviated in Japanese as "Minka") 
has already surfaced in our account. Its inaugural meeting was held on January 12, 
1946. Minka has parallels with the Association of Scientific Workers in England 
and the Federation of Atomic Scientists in the U.S.47 The program was far-reach 
ing: it aimed to (1) build a "democratic" science; (2) resist feudalism and milita 
rism in science; (3) obtain freedom in the pursuit and publication of scientific 
research; (4) fight an anti-democratic education system and its policies; (5) de 
mocratize scientific facilities and organization; (6) ensure that science and tech 
nology contribute to the enrichment of the lives of the people; (7) train and encour 
age promising scientists; (8) strengthen cooperation and dialogue among natural 
scientists, social scientists, and technologists; (9) support the social role of scien 
tists and technologists; (10) facilitate national and international liaison between 
democratic science and technology groups; and (11) assist in the absorption of 
scientific findings of democratic countries.48 Its advocates hoped to build a Minka 
network of branches throughout Japan. At the height of its popularity in late 1949, 
it had 110 branch offices, a specialist membership of 2000, and a student and non 
specialist membership of 11,000. It was headed by the historian of science 
Kinnosuke Ogura, and the many secretaries included Taketani and Sakata. The 
44. Ibid., 92-97, 104-106. 
45. Ibid., 107-108. 
46. Ibid., 118-19. 
47. See Alice Kimball Smith, A peril and a hope: The scientists' movement in America, 
1945-47 (Chicago, 1965); William McGucken, Scientists, society and state: The social re 
lations of science movement in Great Britain, 1931-1947 (Colombus, 1984). 
48. Masanori Onuma, Yoichiro Fujii, and Kunioki Kato, Sengo Nihon kagakusha undoshi, 
jyo {The history of the postwar Japanese scientist movement, Part one) (Tokyo, 1975), 23 
24. 
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membership register included the names of Sin-itiro Tomonaga and Hideki Yukawa, 
with Yukawa's membership marked as being under negotiation.49 While none of 
these four physicists (Taketani, Sakata, Tomonaga, and Yukawa) is known to have 
joined the Communist Party, the Occupation authorities considered Minka to be a 
front for Communists.50 For its members, however, science and democracy were 
matching wheels for social progress. The spread of such associations, growing 
networks of scientists, and the emergence of a public sphere contributed to the 
transition to a civil society in Japan. 
Minka was responsible for producing a long list of periodicals which were part 
of the "literary renaissance" that occurred soon after the surrender. Between 1946 
and 1949, despite various shortages, 110 serious literary magazines were in publi 
cation in Japan. It was within this postwar milieu that Taketani became a major 
contributor on scientific and technological themes to literary magazines, becom 
ing very much an established Marxist intellectual For instance, an essay on his 
Marxist-inspired theory of technology51 appeared in the February 1946 edition of 
Shinsei, and he was one of the founding members of the intellectual group cen 
tered around the magazine Shiso no kagaku (The science of thought). He also par 
ticipated in some activities of the Japanese Communist Party. He was particularly 
concerned about the neglect of the welfare of workers and felt that industrialists 
were more interested in maintaining a low-wage labor force and using imported 
technology. Taketani's influence as a left-wing intellectual did not simply derive 
from intellect and connections, but relied substantially on his writings in the media 
and their coverage of his activities. Conversely, in an interview in Minshu hydron 
(People's review) in June 1949, Taketani criticized the accuracy of reporting in all 
the major Tokyo papers. Taketani suggested that a weekly publication be pro 
duced to act as a media watchdog,52 
reviewing on a nation-wide scale, all newspaper articles on peace movements 
sponsored by intellectuals, and...warning the publishers against any possible mis 
take they may make in the handling of news concerning such movements. 
Like other physicists, Taketani stressed that the value of physics lay in the physi 
49. A list of foundation members and office bearers is included in Hideomi Tuge, Minka to 
watakushi: Sengo hito kagakusha no ayumi (The Association of Democratic Scientists and 
I: The postwar story of a scientist) (Tokyo, 1980), 294. 
50. There are strong parallels with England. See Gary Werskey, The visible college (Lon 
don, 1978). 
51. For an explanation of Taketani's concept of technology see Yoshiro Hoshino, "On 
concepts of technology," in Shigeru Nakayama, David L. Swain, and Eri Yagi, eds., Science 
and society in modern Japan (Tokyo, 1974), 39-50. 
52. Translation of summary of interview with Mituo Taketani, Minshu hyoron (People's 
review), June 1949, GHQ/SCAP records, Item no. 10, ESS (E) 06394, National Diet Li 
brary, Tokyo. 
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cist as moral character, an ideal type of person.53 Through his high media profile, 
he increasingly fashioned himself as a public man. 
Sakata also sought public platforms for his views. On April 30, 1946, at the 
inaugural meeting of the Physical Society of Japan,54 he spoke on democratization 
in the Department of Physics at Nagoya University, where he worked. He advo 
cated that individual laboratories be run so that each scientist could be empowered 
and work free of the feudalistic domination of professors.55 Laboratories, then, 
should be organized according to two basic principles: freedom for each individual 
researcher and effective cooperation. For liaison and deliberation among the groups 
within a department, Sakata proposed a Laboratory Council, allowing all researchers 
a voice in policy. Behind this vision stood the hope that research themes rather 
than actual laboratories would become the basic unit within a department, whose 
highest deliberative organ would be the Department Council. These principles pro 
vided the basis of the new Constitution of the Nagoya University Department of 
Physics and were put into effect beginning June 13,1946. In an article in the Tokyo 
Imperial University newspaper Sakata suggested,56 
"Laboratory Democracy" is an only effective means for the prevention of vicious 
growth of feudalism....It must be extended not only to all the scientific organiza 
tions but also to the development of a whole community. 
Sakata was elected to the Science Council of Japan (JSC) in December 1948. Con 
tinually re-elected, he devoted twenty-two years of his life to its activities.57 His 
colleague Taketani was also elected. 
One key theme for both physicists was atomic energy. In his writings, Taketani 
helped educate the public about its facts and implications.58 Hoping to prevent its 
53. This is discussed in Paul Forman, "Social niche and self-image of the American physi 
cist," in Michelangelo De Maria, Mario Grilli, and Fabio Sebastiani, eds., The restructuring 
of physical sciences in Europe and the United States, 1945-1960 (Singapore, 1989), 96 
104, esp. 98. 
54. The Physical Society of Japan was established from part of what had previously been 
the Physico-Mathematical Society of Japan. A particle theory sectional meeting was formed 
at the same time. This group later divided up into a particle theory and nuclear theory group. 
Tetu Hirosige, Sengo Nihon no kagaku undo (Postwar Japan science movement) (Tokyo, 
1960), 181-182. Bi-annual meetings of the Elementary Particle Theory Forum (as part of 
Physical Society conferences) have provided and do still provide an occasion for group 
decision-making, while administrative work has been shared by an "Elementary Particle 
Theory Group Secretariat" which rotates every 3 to 4 months from campus to campus. 
55. Cf. Bernal (ref. 41), 265. 
56. Draft translation by "George" of Shoichi Sakata, "Abolish the sectionalism: On the 
democratization of [sic] research system," Tokyo Imperial University newspaper, no. 1004 
(Wed., 13 Nov 1946), GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (E) 06393, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
57. Sakata (ref. 38), 48. 
58. Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Nihon no genshiryoku: 15 nen no ayumi, jyo (Atomic 
energy in Japan: A 15-year history, part 1) (Tokyo, 1971), 12-14. 
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use for military purposes, Taketani proposed the famous three principles for the 
peaceful use of atomic energy, calling for public disclosure, democratic manage 
ment, and research autonomy. Sakata's further advocacy of the importance of the 
"three principles" ensured that public debate over atomic energy continued. The 
two physicists' actions had a major impact on the formulation of the Basic Atomic 
Energy Law passed by the Diet in 1955, which forbade use of atomic energy for 
military purposes and incorporated the three principles. 
Finally, Sakata and Taketani's aspirations found a home in a larger collection 
of physicists, the Elementary Particle Theory Group. The group can first be traced 
back to symposia on meson theory held before and during World War II, with 
around twenty participants principally from Riken and the imperial universities of 
Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagoya.59 Through the Elementary Particle Theory 
Group physicists sought to influence science policy and bring about the ".modern 
ization" of the research system. At the end of 1949 a university-based network of 
nine branches was set up throughout Japan, and by 1950, membership had grown 
to well over one hundred, with some estimates as high as double that figure.60 The 
award of the 1949 Nobel Prize for Physics to Hideki Yukawa boosted the group's 
profile, with the result that the group became somewhat of a favorite of the me 
dia.61 (The Nobel Prize, Japan's first, also led the National Diet to recommend an 
increase in government funding of research and development.) 
By the end of the 1950s, membership of the Group exceeded three hundred. 
Despite its democratic aspirations, it displayed a definite hierarchy along genera 
tional lines: "daibosu" ("big bosses"), "chubosu" ("middle bosses"), and "kobosu" 
("little bosses"): Hideki Yukawa, Sin-itiro Tomonaga, Shoichi Sakata, and Mituo 
Taketani were the first generation, the "middle bosses" included Seitaro Nakamura, 
Takeshi Inoue, Nobuyuki Fukuda, Satio Hayakawa, Yoichi Fujimoto, Hiroomi 
Umezawa, and Eiji Yamada, and the "little bosses" were the postwar generation 
who followed.62 
By means of all these channels?the Elementary Particle Theory Group, the 
media, Minka, and the Science Council?Taketani and Sakata struggled to create 
a space to fight for not only the particular interests of scientists, but their version of 
the public interest and demands for a public sphere. But shortly before his death, 
59. Elementary Particle Theory Group, Nagoya University Branch, "A short history of the 
research group of the theory of elementary particles of Japan," mimeographed article, Sakata 
Archival Library, Nagoya University, 5. 
60. For a list of these members see Yoshinori Kaneseki, "The Elementary Particle Theory 
Group," in Nakayama et al. (ref. 51), 221-252, esp. 222-229. 
61. Tetu Hirosige, Sengo Nihon no kagaku undo (Postwar Japan science movement) (To 
kyo, 1960), 184-185. 
62. Kiyonobu Itakura, "Kagakusha no jishuteki na soshiki" ("An independent organization 
of scientists"), in Mituo Taketani, ed., Shizen kagaku gairon, daiikkan: Kagaku gijutsu to 
Nihon shakai (An introduction to the natural sciences, Vol. 1: Science, technology and 
Japanese society) (Tokyo, 1962), 155-173. 
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reflecting on more than two decades of the Science Council, Sakata bemoaned 
how the "logic of government" dominated the "logic of science." Although the 
Science Council had been active, moves to bypass it were increasing.63 With fail 
ing health, Sakata resigned from his JSC Committee chairmanship and died on 
October 16,1970.64 Taketani, who taught at Rikkyo University then left the educa 
tion sector to pursue fulltime writing, out-lived Sakata and continues to write to 
this day. Nonetheless, Sakata's death marked the end of a period of the physicist 
as general expert on things scientific: the increased number of specialists made 
"expertise" more accessible and fragmented any political influence that expert 
authority wielded.65 
Hideki Yukawa and Sin-itiro Tomonaga 
In his voluminous writings, Yukawa highlighted the importance of cultural 
traditions to his work in physics.66 These writings, his status as Japan's first Nobel 
laureate, and his long directorship of the Research Institute for Fundamental Phys 
ics earned him a special place among physicists. Like Sakata, he came from a 
privileged background. He was born in Tokyo on January 23, 1907, the third son 
of Takuji Ogawa, who was a staff member of the governmental Geological Survey 
Bureau, part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.67 In 1908, Takuji moved 
to Kyoto University to take up a chair in geography in the Faculty of Arts. Hideki 
learned the Chinese classics from his grandfather, Nanmei Asai, a former Confu 
cian scholar for the Tanabe feudal clan. Hideki's maternal grandfather, Komakitsu 
Ogawa, had been a samurai at the Tokugawa castle in Wakayama.68 Both sides of 
his family had a tradition of learning. 
Hideki gained admission to Kyoto Imperial University in 1926. He graduated 
in 1929 and stayed on that year as an unpaid associate pursuing theoretical physics 
in the lab of Professor Kajuro Tamaki in the Faculty of Science. Hideki studied 
there with his colleague Sin-itiro Tomonaga.69 Hideki Ogawa married Sumiko 
63. "Kagaku no ronri to seiji no ronri: Gakujutsu Kaigi nijunen" ("The logic of science and 
the logic of government: Twenty years of the Science Council of Japan") (1968), in Sakata 
(ref. 38), 389-393. 
64. Sakata (ref. 38), 430. 
65. This was also the case in the U.S. See Brian Balogh, Chain reaction: Expert debate and 
public participation in American commercial nuclear power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, 1991). 
66. See for example, Hideki Yukawa, trans. L.M. Brown and R. Yoshida, Tabibito (The 
traveler) (Singapore, 1982); Hideki Yukawa, trans. John Bester, Creativity and intuition: A 
physicist looks at East and West (Tokyo, 1973). 
67. Takashi Hayakawa, Nihon no joryu shakai to keibatsu (Japan's social elite and matri 
monial influence) (Tokyo, 1983), 232. 
68. Yasutaka Tanikawa, "Introduction and biographical sketch," in Hideki Yukawa, Hideki 
Yukawa: Scientific works (Tokyo, 1979), vii-viii. 
69. Yukawa, Traveler (ref. 66), 170. 
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(Sumi) Yukawa on April 23,1932, and was adopted into her family,70 taking on the 
family name of Yukawa and moving to nearby Osaka. Appointed lecturer that year 
at Kyoto's Faculty of Science, Yukawa taught quantum mechanics and carried out 
theoretical research in nuclear physics and cosmic rays. There second-year stu 
dents included Shoichi Sakata and Minoru Kobayashi, who attended Yukawa's 
first lectures; Mituo Taketani would take the quantum mechanics course the fol 
lowing year.71 Yukawa continued to teach at Kyoto until March 1934.72 
In his research Yukawa thought that the "strong" force at work within the nucleus 
could be reduced to the exchange of a new particle between proton and neutron, 
the meson.73 Meson theory was developed in a number of papers in collaboration 
with Sakata, Taketani, and Minoru Kobayashi. Along the way Yukawa was pro 
moted to Associate Professor in 1936 and in 1938 received his D.Sc. Yukawa re 
turned to Kyoto Imperial University in 1938 to replace the recently deceased Prof. 
Kajuro Tamaki. From that year onward, Yukawa was a member of the National 
Research Council (a prewar government body for the promotion of research) and 
beginning in the following year became formally affiliated with Riken as well as 
Tokyo Imperial University, where he taught from time to time. During the war he 
continued his theoretical research and is listed as one of the participants in a small 
scale, Kyoto-based atomic bomb project towards the end of the war.74 
After the war, Yukawa founded the journal Progress of theoretical physics', the 
first issue appeared in July 1946.75 He left Japan on September 2,1948, to take up 
Robert Oppenheimer's invitation of a visiting professorship at the Institute for 
Advanced Study in Princeton,76 and on July 1, 1949, accepted an appointment to 
the physics staff at Columbia University.77 While away he was awarded his Nobel 
Prize and elected to the Science Council of Japan. On his return in 1953, Yukawa 
was installed as director of the Research Institute for Fundamental Physics (RIFP) 
70. "Translation of Yukawa family record register," ESS files, GHQ/SCAP records, ESS 
(B) 11648, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
71. Yukawa, Traveler (ref. 66), 188. 
72. Takeo Kuwabara, Ken Inoue and Michiji Konuma, eds., Yukawa Hideki (Hideki Yukawa) 
(Tokyo, 1984), 325; Yukawa, Traveler (ref. 66), 196-197. 
73. Yukawa (ref. 68). 
74. History of Science Society of Japan, ed., Nihon kagaku gijutsushi taikei, 13: butsurigaku 
(An outline of the history of science and technology in Japan, Vol. 13: Physics) (Tokyo, 
1970), 441. 
75. Michiji Konuma, "Social aspects of Japanese particle physics in the 1950s," in Laurie 
M. Brown, Max Dresden, and Lillian Hoddeson, eds., Pions to quarks: Particle physics in 
the 1950s (Cambridge, 1989), 536-548. 
76. For details see Michiji Konuma, Chieko Masuzawa, and Yoshio Takada, "Resumption 
of international relationship of Japanese particle physicists after World War II," Historia 
scientiarum, 36 (1989), 23-41. 
77. H.C. Kelly to Colonel L.K. Bunker, "Award of Nobel peace prize to Dr. Hideki Yukawa," 
4 Nov 1949, ESS files, GHQ/SCAP records, National Diet Library, Tokyo. Laurence Bun 
ker was a close military aide of General MacArthur. 
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at Kyoto University. In 1956 he became a member of the newly-established Japan 
Atomic Energy Commission, while the Elementary Particle Theory Group pro 
vided him with organizational support and a wide national network. The press 
considered Yukawa's presence on the JAEC as an important voice of caution. On 
March 18,1957, however Yukawa resigned from the Commission, citing ill-health; 
to some extent he was replaced in this official function by physicists such as 
Ryokichi Sagane and Seishi Kikuchi.78 
The more outgoing Tomonaga, for his part, had long been considered Nishina's 
successor. In the Science Council, whose president he became, his strong interper 
sonal skills were put to good use. Like Yukawa, he came from a highly cultured 
family and was renowned for his literary ability.79 Born less than a year before 
Yukawa, on March 31, 1906, he was the eldest son of Sanjuro Tomonaga, who in 
turn was of Nagasaki samurai background. Sanjuro had studied philosophy and 
history of philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University and at the time of Sin-itiro's 
birth was professor of philosophy at Shinshu University (later known as Otani 
University) in Tokyo. The following year he took up the position of Associate 
Professor at Kyoto Imperial University and in 1909 decided to go to Europe for 
further study, leaving his wife and child in Tokyo.80 Yoshio Nishina would later 
provide a father-figure for the mentor-less young man. 
Sanjuro returned to Japan in 1913 and the entire family took up residence again 
in Kyoto, where he was made professor. In 1926, Tomonaga gained admission to 
the Faculty of Science at Kyoto Imperial University, where he majored in physics. 
He and Hideki Yukawa both chose to specialize in quantum mechanics in their 
third year in 1928. Tomonaga graduated in 1929 and like Yukawa chose to remain 
at the university as an unpaid associate. Tomonaga joined the Nishina lab at Riken 
in 1932 where Sakata followed in 1933. After a period of studying nuclear theory 
at Leipzig University under Werner Heisenberg from June 1937 to August 1939, 
Tomonaga returned to Japan and received his D.Sc. from Tokyo Imperial Univer 
sity. In June 1940 he became a Riken research fellow, and, beginning in 1941, a 
professor at the Tokyo University of Science and Literature. 
From around mid-1943, Tomonaga was mobilized with other physicists to carry 
out research on magnetrons and ultra-shortwave circuits at the Naval Research 
Institute laboratory at Shimada. In 1946 he won the Asahi Cultural Prize (a presti 
gious prize awarded by the Asahi Shinbun newspaper for cultural achievement) 
for his work on meson theory and his super-many-time formulation of quantum 
field theory. With Nishina busy with administration after the war, the leadership of 
the Tokyo group of physicists shifted to Tomonaga. The Tomonaga Seminar be 
78. For details of Kikuchi's career see Kikuchi Kinen Jigyokai Henshu Iinkai, ed., Kikuchi 
Seishi: Gydseki to tsuiso (Seishi Kikuchi: Achievements and reminiscences) (Tokyo, 1978). 
79. His writings have been published as a 15-volume set entitled Tomonaga Shinichiro: 
Chosakushu (The collected works of Sin-itiro Tomonaga) (Tokyo, 1984, 1985). 
80. Kennosuke Matsui, ed., Kaiso no Tomonaga Sin-itiro (Reminiscences of Sin-itiro 
Tomonaga) (Tokyo, 1980), 3-6, 8. 
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came a mecca for physicists, and in 1948 he was elected to the Science Council of 
Japan. The following year, Tomonaga visited the Institute for Advanced Study at 
Princeton.81 He received the Nobel Prize in 1965, shared with Richard Feynman 
and Julian Schwinger for their contributions to quantum electrodynamics. 
Already with the death of Nishina in 1951, Tomonaga took on further respon 
sibility for nuclear physics and science policy.82 These matters were discussed at 
various meetings of the Physical Society of Japan and at the JSC Special Commit 
tee for Nuclear Research (SCNR), which, under Tomonaga's chairmanship, played 
an important role in formulating plans. In 1959 he was appointed to the new Sci 
ence and Technology Council (the government's rival to the Science Council) and 
in 1963 elected president of the Science Council itself, remaining in that post until 
1969. The Science and Technology Council was of the government's own making 
and effectively the highest science policymaking body in Japan. It enjoyed strong 
ties with the Liberal Democratic Party and bureaucracy. While Sakata criticized 
its overly cozy relationship with the establishment, Tomonaga's attraction to it 
may have been due to its focus on science and technology (rather than coverage of 
all fields of scholarship, like the Science Council of Japan) and the hope of greater 
influence in policymaking. Scientists had long been perceived as left-wing, anti 
big business and keen to distance themselves from the bureaucracy. Tomonaga 
arguably attempted to break down this stereotype. Facilities for big science could 
only be established with cooperation. Subsequently, the president of the Science 
Council automatically became a member of the Science and Technology Council. 
Tomonaga and Yukawa both put their prestige behind antinuclear and world 
government efforts. The Japanese movement to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs 
effectively started only after the Bikini Atoll hydrogen bomb test on March 1, 
1954, when a small Japanese fishing boat, the "Lucky Dragon" was showered 
with radioactive ash. Yukawa was a member of the organizing committee for the 
World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held at Hiroshima dur 
ing August 6-8,1955, and one of eleven signatories to the Russell-Einstein Mani 
festo, promulgated by eight Nobel prize winners and other scientists. In 1955, 
Yukawa became a member of the World Peace Appeal Group of Seven Commit 
tee, later to be joined by Tomonaga and the Nobel-prize-winning novelist Yasunari 
Kawabata; the group served as part of the League for the Establishment of a World 
Federation of Nations. In 1957 Yukawa and Tomonaga attended the First Pugwash 
Conference, held in Canada. Continuing his efforts on behalf of world govern 
ment, in 1958 Yukawa became an adviser to the World Association of World Fed 
eralists and a few years later, in 1961, was elected President, continuing in that 
81. "Japan's hidden physicists: Men who will follow in Yukawa's footsteps," Nippon times 
(22 Nov 1949), GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (E) 06365, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
82. Satio Hayakawa, "Kenkyu shinko ni tsutometa Tomonaga sensei" ("Prof. Tomonaga: A 
man who strove for the advancement of research"), Kagaku (Science), 49:12 (Dec 1979), 
799-803, on 799. 
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position until 1965. In 1962, the first meeting of the Kyoto Conference of Scien 
tists was held, with Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata as the key organizers. Yukawa 
in particular hoped to use the conference to develop a strategy of nuclear deter 
rence more in keeping with the original Russell-Einstein Manifesto, which called 
for the abolition of nuclear weapons.83 
The Nobel prize winners Hideki Yukawa and Sin-itiro Tomonaga differed from 
Sakata and Taketani in that it was more their physics than their political philoso 
phy that provided the backbone for the high esteem in which they were held. They 
illustrate yet another variation of the public man. Background factors such as fam 
ily, upbringing, and education can account for some of the differences among the 
four, but the award to Yukawa and later Tomonaga of the ultimate accolade in 
physics, the Nobel Prize, served to separate them from other physicists in the minds 
of the public. Yukawa tended to advocate a solitary symbiosis with Japan's tradi 
tions, drawing on Eastern philosophies to account for the success of his ideas. 
Tomonaga had a more open and engaging personality. In his spare time, he in 
dulged in rakugo comic storytelling, a pastime that requires an audience. Each of 
the four key physicists mapped out his respective territory of influence with Yukawa 
in Kyoto, Tomonaga in Tokyo, Sakata in Nagoya, and Taketani occupying the 
periphery where intellectual free spirits reside. All four portrayed themselves as 
bulwarks against the profit-hungry private sector and military-minded politicians. 
A notable exception was Ryokichi Sagane, son of Hantaro Nagaoka. 
Ryokichi Sagane 
Ryokichi Sagane was a physicist who left academia and immersed himself in 
the technocracy. Sagane's background in experimental physics gave him the tech 
nical experience to pursue the development of civilian nuclear power, and Japan's 
fledgling atomic energy program provided him with a reason to return from the 
U.S. in the mid-1950s. 
Sagane was born in Tokyo on November 27, 1905, the fourth son of the emi 
nent physicist Hantaro Nagaoka. In 1914, he was adopted by Mrs. Chiyo Sagane, 
thenceforth taking on her family name.84 He entered the Department of Physics, 
Tokyo Imperial University, in 1926, where he continued with graduate school be 
ginning in 1929. In 1931 he became one of the first members of Nishina's new lab, 
where he remained heavily engaged despite being appointed lecturer in April 1933 
at Tokyo Imperial University. From August 1935 to November 1936, he conducted 
research at Ernest Lawrence's Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley. Construction of 
a 26-inch cyclotron subsequently commenced at Riken and was completed by April 
1937. Sagane received his D.Sc. in December 1939 with a dissertation entitled, 
83. Yukawa, Creativity (ref. 66), 191. 
84. "Translation of extract of census register, Omura city, Nagasaki prefecture, 17 Septem 
ber 1949," GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (B) 11649, "Travel abroad of Dr. Sagane" file, 9, 
National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
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"On artificial radioactivity."85 Around the beginning of the Pacific War, Sagane 
was called upon often to help in military research and in May 1942 was made a full 
research member of Riken. In March 1943 he was promoted to Professor at Tokyo 
Imperial University. He was involved in policy making from 1943 when he be 
came a member of the National Research Council. 
After the war, Sagane's ability to speak some English enabled him to make 
representations to SCAP on behalf of his fellow scientists. He was a member of a 
variety of committees, including the Renewal Committee for Science Organiza 
tion (August 1948?January 1949). Sagane left Japan the following year to accept 
a visiting professorship in the Department of Physics, Iowa State College, from 
January 1 to July 1,1950,86 thus joining the brain drain of outstanding young physi 
cists who went to the U.S., such as Yukawa, Tomonaga, Seishi Kikuchi, Satio 
Hayakawa, and Yoichiro Nambu. Sagane stayed overseas for over five years and 
even resigned from Tokyo University due to his lengthy absence. 
Upon his return from the U.S. in 1955, Sagane facilitated the implementation 
of Japan's nuclear policy, from negotiating the importation of reactor technology 
to advising on the construction of power plants and ensuring their successful op 
eration. In March 1956, he signed on as a consultant to the JAEC and on June 26, 
1956 became a director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). 
In May 1960, he was made part-time executive director of Japan Atomic Power 
Company (JAPCO), advancing a year later to full-time executive director. His 
views differed from Sakata, Taketani, Yukawa, and Tomonaga, who were all theo 
retical physicists lacking experience in building apparatus. Sagane, an experimen 
tal physicist, had more in common with his former boss, Nishina, who had origi 
nally been trained as an engineer. 
Sagane changed the meaning of physicist as public man, for he engaged in 
non-university, public corporation science. He then redefined the idea of scholar 
in public service.87 Sagane represented a new breed of physicist turned technocrat, 
opting to leave academia to become an insider in Japan's civilian nuclear power 
program. Sagane was a far less visible public man than his physicist colleagues, 
but it was perhaps a sign of the times, as "public" came to be associated with 
public corporations such as JAERI, and public enterprises like the JAPCO. In 
deed, by the 1960s, the bureaucracy had become a very powerful political force, 
with former bureaucrats becoming politicians and joining the private sector on 
retirement. The ruling LDP had formed in 1955 from various conservative parties, 
and it continued in power until 1993. The LDP, bureaucrats, and big business formed 
85. Kqji Fushimi, "Sagane Ryokichi sensei no mutsu no katsudo so" ("Six aspects of the 
activities of Prof. Ryokichi Sagane"), in Publication Committee, ed., Sagane Ryokichi kinen 
bunshu (Collection of writings to commemorate Ryokichi Sagane) (Tokyo, 1981), 121-124, 
on 121 and iii. 
86. Fox to Kelly, 27 Oct 1949, GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (B) 11649, National Diet Library, 
Tokyo. 
87. Publication Committee, ed. (ref. 85). 
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a triumvirate of political power that blurred the boundaries between the state and 
civil society, and between the public and private sector.88 Public discussion as 
embodied by Sakata and Taketani and their calls for openness and transparency in 
policymaking tended to retreat; dealings between politicians and the private sector 
became the norm. The experience of Satio Hayakawa, finally, shows that access to 
politicians and bureaucrats can be more important to doing big science than a high 
public profile.89 
Satio Hayakawa 
Satio Hayakawa (born in Niihama city, Ehime prefecture in 1923) was one of 
the "chubosu" ("middle bosses") of the Elementary Particle Theory Group who 
graduated from the university around World War II. In his case, he entered Tokyo 
Imperial University in October 1942, majoring in physics. He completed his stud 
ies at the end of the war in September 1945. His subsequent career provides a 
useful window from which to view the role played by physicists in policymaking 
and the broader society up until 1970. 
Hayakawa initially worked on nuclear physics and elementary particle theory, 
concentrating especially on cosmic rays and astrophysics. As a member of one of 
Tomonaga's study groups, he helped to develop the super-many-time theory and 
renormalization theory immediately after the war. His earliest papers were co 
authored with Tomonaga.90 From mid-1949, Hayakawa lectured in the Faculty of 
Science and Engineering at Osaka City University where there was a group of 
outstanding young physicists including Yoshio Yamaguchi and Yoichiro Nambu.91 
88. The diversity inherent within each group of actors goes beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it is fair to say that organizations such as Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organiza 
tions) serve as the leading voice and interest group for big business. Similarly, the minis 
tries and agencies the bureaucracy each have their own characteristics and culture, but they 
are a highly educated elite with a number of common traits. Tokyo University graduates 
have dominated the civil service, with Law School alumni being particularly influential. 
There have been strong ties among the bureaucracy, Liberal Democratic Party and private 
sector, with many cases of public officials retiring from government ministries and standing 
for Parliament as LDP candidates or taking up positions on the boards of companies in areas 
related to their former ministries. See Johnson (ref. 22). 
89. Satio Hayakawa and Morris F. Low, "Science policy and politics in post-war Japan: 
The establishment of the KEK High Energy Physics Laboratory," Annals of science, 48 
(1991), 207-229; Lillian Hoddeson, "Establishing K.E.K. in Japan and Fermilab in the U.S.: 
Internationalism, nationalism and high energy accelerators," Social studies of science, 13 
(1983), 1-48. 
90. Satio Hayakawa, "List of academic publications," Hayakawa collection, Sakata Archi 
val Library, Nagoya University. 
91. "Personal history of Satio Hayakawa," GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (E) 06383, National 
Diet Library, Tokyo. Laurie M. Brown, "Yoichiro Nambu: The first forty years," Progress 
of theoretical physics supplement, no. 86 (1986), 1-11, draft of manuscript, 5, courtesy of 
Laurie Brown, Northwestern University. 
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In May 1950, Hayakawa left Japan to participate in the Foreign Student Summer 
Project at M.I.T., where he worked for seven months with Bruno Rossi in the 
Laboratory for Nuclear Science and Engineering.92 Hayakawa went on to England, 
France, and then India before returning to Japan in January 1952. In his absence, 
he received his D.Sc. from Tokyo University in November 1951 for research on 
cosmic ray high energy phenomena. 
Hayakawa's experience abroad confirmed for him the benefits of science as an 
international and progressive force, something that would enable Japan to pick 
itself up from defeat, win friends, and gain international prestige. From July 1952 
to October 1953, he was a member of the organizing committee for the Interna 
tional Conference on Theoretical Physics held in Tokyo and Kyoto in September 
1953 under the auspices of the Science Council. In January 1954, Hayakawa took 
up a professorial position?at the young age of 30?at the new Research Institute 
for Fundamental Physics at Kyoto University. In April 1956 he became a specialist 
member of the Tokyo University Institute for Nuclear Study preparatory commit 
tee, and, in May 1958, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. Committee mem 
berships continued with the Science Council of Japan's Special Committee for 
Nuclear Research in December 1958, the SCNR's Subcommittee for Future Plans 
for Nuclear Research in July 1959, and the Cabinet's Council for Space Develop 
ment in December 1960. Hayakawa also made a point of traveling overseas during 
these years. In March 1959 he became professor at Nagoya University, specializ 
ing in astrophysics, especially infra-red astronomy. In the early 1960s, with the 
discovery of x-ray emission from space, Hayakawa.began cosmic x-ray observa 
tions and helped to clarify the existence of high temperature plasmas in the vicin 
ity of the sun. 
Hayakawa became increasingly well-known among the international physics 
community. For at least the first ten years of the Kyoto-based, English-language 
journal Progress of theoretical physics, Hayakawa was the largest single contribu 
tor of papers, with research that spanned elementary particle theory, nuclear phys 
ics, solid state theory, relativity, cosmic rays, and astrophysics. He also played a 
formative role in the establishment of the Institute of Plasma Physics (Nagoya 
University), the Institute for Space and Astronautical Science (Tokyo University), 
and the KEK High Energy Physics Laboratory (K6 Enerugi Butsurigaku Kenkyujo) 
at Tsukuba. In the process Hayakawa helped bring "big science" to Japan. As with 
Sagane, this demanded certain skills of scholarly judgment, leadership, and an 
ability to communicate with bureaucracy and foreign scientists: an outgoing "in 
ternational scientist" with good English skills like Hayakawa was key. Through 
his career, we can also see how Japan's space program owed as much to a desire 
for international prestige as to any perceived need to keep up with the forefront of 
science. The International Geophysical Year (1957-58) and Sputnik were strong 
92. Bruno Rossi to Hayakawa, 3 Apr 1950, GHQ/SCAP records, ESS (E) 06384, National 
Diet Library, Tokyo. 
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incentives to expand Japan's own research.93 But to do so required the nurturing of 
an astrophysics community, which Hayakawa duly did. Likewise with fusion, 
Hayakawa set about encouraging local research interest. 
Physicists as public men 
The ideas of modernity?progress, science, and rationalism?have been im 
portant to the Japanese people since the nineteenth century. The postwar goal of 
reconstruction and economic growth provided a public space even for physicists. 
Physicists had internalized a set of normative ideals and rules required by mem 
bership of the international scientific community. This included professional in 
tegrity, honesty, and standards of scholarship and technical competence. Such com 
mitments arguably facilitated the emergence of a public sphere and, belatedly, a 
rational and more publicly accountable bureaucracy.94 
In all of this the role of the public man and the concept of public interest were 
changing, dependent on the actor, his background and beliefs, and the context 
within which he worked. These physicists' "objectivity" hid different worldviews 
and different assumptions about their science.95 Given these variables, it is not 
surprising that their impact on policymaking would differ, depending upon the 
actor and time. Nonetheless one commonality is striking: the physicists' attempt 
throughout this period to transcend the devastation of a defeated Japan, to help 
rebuild their country, and above all to seek an idealized truth. Indeed a book writ 
ten by some of the physicists was given the title Standing in the field of truth.96 
While it is easy to trivialize such pursuits, given our understanding of views on the 
social construction of knowledge, it is nevertheless impressive how these men's 
lives were motivated by the unattainable goal of a complete knowledge of the 
world. They sought to instill their values in the broader society, values that were 
distinct from those of business. But by the late 1960s, the image of the physicist as 
moral character was no longer plausible. It became clear that the production of 
knowledge was tied to politics. University unrest and environmental problems in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s created disillusionment with not only the bureau 
cracy but with scientists too. The quality of life that many Japanese had hoped for 
seems to have eluded them. In October 1970, the Science Council of Japan re 
93. Fae L. Korsmo, "Science in the Cold War: The legacy of the International Geophysical 
Year," paper presented at the International Conference on Science, Technology and Society, 
Hiroshima, 20 Mar 1998. 
94. This idea is discussed in Victor M. Perez-Diaz, The return of civil society: The emer 
gence of democratic Spain (Cambridge, 1998), 50-51. 
95. Morris F. Low, "Japan: The political economy of Japanese science 
? 
Nakasone, physi 
cists and the state," in Etel Solingen, ed., Scientists and the state: Domestic structures and 
the international context (Ann Arbor, 1994), 93-125. 
96. Hideki Yukawa, Shoichi Sakata, and Mituo Taketani, Shinri no ha ni tachite (Standing 
in the field of truth) (Tokyo, 1951). 
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solved to devote greater energy to examining the problems that had accompanied 
Japan's high economic growth, and sought scientific and technical solutions to 
them.97 
The Science Council has long been seen as a parliament of scientists, a way by 
which more than 200,000 research workers in Japan could express their opinions 
to government through their directly elected representatives. Although under the 
jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and funded out of the national budget, the Coun 
cil has functioned independently of the government and is only responsible to the 
scientists and the scholars who elect it. The Science Council makes recommenda 
tions and proposals to the government relating to science-related matters. "Sci 
ence" is interpreted as meaning not only natural science but the humanities and 
social sciences as well. 
The Science Council has been important in helping to shape the Ministry of 
Education's grants policy, lobbying for the establishment of new research insti 
tutes, and protecting the rights of scientists and scholars. A longstanding concern 
has been the development of Japan's nuclear power program, which the Council 
has tended to oppose. By the 1980s its influence had greatly diminished, and the 
Ministry of Education has tended to rely on its own internal council and advisors. 
There were attempts to reform the Science Council since the mid-1980s, with rep 
resentatives being appointed by scientific societies.98 
Physicists as policymakers 
The postwar policymaking system was complex. Uniting one group of actors, 
the Elementary Particle Theory Group exercised much influence. While this circle 
can be viewed as an interest group with the concerns of its membership at heart, 
and somewhat like a club with a hierarchy of different levels of "bosses," it never 
theless framed its activities in terms of the public good. Soon after the end of the 
war, physicists promoted research conducted in a "democratic" way that would 
encourage greater sharing of scarce resources. They sought to overcome the domi 
nant role of the professor in academia and encourage greater participation in deci 
sion-making. A major activity of the group was promoting an awareness of the 
social responsibility of scientists. The group was one of many opposing the hy 
drogen bomb in 1950. The physicists grappled with problems raised by the civil 
ian atomic energy program and promoted a more open approach to developing 
nuclear power. They fought to ensure "peaceful" uses of the atom by objecting to 
visits to Japanese ports by U.S. nuclear submarines. And for some such as Sakata 
and Taketani, there was also a clear ideological mission to apply dialectical mate 
rialism as a methodology to develop elementary particle physics.99 
97. Yuichi Ochi, "The organization and activities of the Science Council of Japan," Nature, 
240 (24 Nov 1972), 187-190. 
98. Alun Anderson, "Elected body goes out fighting," Nature, 315 (2 May 1985), 4. 
99. Tokyo-Nagoya Working Group of Physics for 1964 Peking Symposium, "Methodology 
of elementary particle physics in Japan," Sakata Archival Library, Nagoya University. 
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Yukawa's Nobel prize gave the group media attention and provided opportuni 
ties to influence public opinion. The establishment of the Research Institute for 
Fundamental Physics at Kyoto University then provided a power base. The Group's 
"big bosses" were Yukawa, Tomonaga, Sakata, and Taketani, with Hayakawa, 
Tomonaga's student, as one of the up-and-coming "middle bosses." The RIFP and 
its democratically-run management committee provided a model for an array of 
joint-use research institutes that followed. 
Within the Group, different actors followed different strategies. Yukawa and 
Tomonaga had more interaction with the power elite. Yukawa's scientific prestige 
and academic power were co-opted by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission when 
it appointed him a member in 1956. Tomonaga contributed to policymaking mainly 
through the Science Council, of which he was President. While Yukawa was en 
sconced in Kyoto as RIFP director, Tomonaga set about establishing the Institute 
for Nuclear Study in Tokyo. Through their public activity Sakata and Taketani, by 
contrast, carried their commitment to democracy in science into policymaking, 
arguing that atomic energy research and development should be performed and 
managed in as open a manner as possible. Unlike the situation in France and the 
U.S., atomic energy for military purposes in Japan was not an option. Sakata and 
Taketani helped shape the Basic Atomic Energy Law of 1955 and influenced the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles declared in 1967. Despite their accomplishments, 
Sakata and Taketani were "outsiders," seeking to influence government policy 
from beyond the establishment. Taking into account their role enables us to form a 
fuller, more pluralistic image of power and influence in Japan. 
Unlike the big four of Yukawa, Tomonaga, Sakata, and Taketani, Sagane re 
jected academia and plunged into the technocracy. The rise of Sagane as techno 
crat coincided with the decline of the Science Council as an important forum; the 
establishment of the rival Science and Technology Council in 1959 provided the 
government with a high-level body with its own interests at heart. Sagane influ 
enced policy and its execution as only a true insider could. His family background, 
career in experimental physics, and research experience abroad provided him with 
the technical expertise, contacts, and language skills for the successful introduc 
tion of U.S. civilian nuclear technology. His two long stays in Berkeley enabled 
him to facilitate the growing technological ties between the U.S. and Japan. 
Sagane's experience also shows that internationalism in science was a pre 
requisite for accessing the latest know-how. Satio Hayakawa also understood from 
an early date that Japan's future in science was linked with the U.S. He and many 
of his generation relished the opportunities that the U.S.-Japan relationship cre 
ated. He, too, joined the postwar brain drain to the U.S., studying at M.I.T. and 
Cornell. What is outstanding about his career is his breadth of research and his 
ability to establish infrastructures for nuclear fusion, space science, and accelera 
tor physics. This facility, combined with a thorough-going internationalism, helped 
ensure that Japan would not be left behind in these critical fields. Playing a forma 
tive role the Institute of Plasma Physics (Nagoya), the Institute for Space and As 
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tronautical Science (Tokyo), and KEK High Energy Physics Laboratory 
(Tsukuba),100he helped bring big science to Japan.101 
Hayakawa's story most importantly reveals the dynamics of policymaking and 
the re-emergence, after the war, of a multi-layered policymaking system. The Ja 
pan Atomic Energy Commission, the Science and Technology Agency established 
by the government in 1956, the Science and Technology Council, and other bodies 
displaced the Science Council in areas where physicists considered they had terri 
torial rights. The all-important autonomy they had fought for was increasingly 
constrained. Indeed the complex system of policymaking that emerged in the 
postwar period is reminiscent of the wartime mobilization of science. SCAP was 
careful to give the Science Council only limited power, thus ensuring from the 
outset that physicists as policymakers would only enjoy limited effectiveness. The 
government, concurring, could seek the advice of the Council but was not bound 
to do so. This set in course the emergence of government bodies more attuned to 
the needs of the state and big business. In the 1960s, left-wing parties and unions 
had become somewhat marginalized. Japan's high economic growth and growing 
prosperity tended to make social protest less urgent. 
The physicists discussed in this essay deployed their idea of science as a glo 
balizing force for change. Many of them can be regarded as nonstate actors who? 
with the exception of Sagane?saw themselves as largely autonomous of the state 
and transcending private and individual interests. Through organizations such as 
the Science Council of Japan, they sought to influence governance, especially in 
science-related matters. In many ways, then, they were seeking to establish a type 
of civil society, albeit with scientists as the bearers of expertise. The samurai had 
previously created a public sphere of sorts, accustoming the Japanese to the role of 
intellectuals in public debate. Defeat in the Pacific War and the reforms encour 
aged by the Allied Occupation forced the Japanese to move away from an authori 
tarian style of politics to one in which the military was no longer a major force. In 
the wake of Japan's defeat, physicists sought to reimagine Japanese society.102 
Yoshihiko Uchida and Kiyoaki Hirata have argued that civil society has tradition 
ally been weak in Japan, and that individual deference to power has meant that 
capitalism has developed with little social resistance.103 Japan's physicists did 
attempt to resist. They help us to understand how civil society developed in Japan 
100. Hayakawa and Low (ref. 89); Hoddeson (ref. 89). 
101. Nagoya University, Hayakawa Sachio sensei tsuisdroku (Collection of reminiscences 
of Professor Satio Hayakawa) (Nagoya, 1994). 
102. Victoria Lynn Bestor, "Reimagining 'civil society' in Japan," paper presented at "Civil 
society in Japan (and America): Coping with change" (Washington, D.C., 1998). 
103. Yoshihiko Uchida, Nihon shihonshugi no shisozo (Images of Japanese capitalism) 
(Tokyo, 1967); Kiyoaki Hirata, Shimin shakai to shakaishugi (Civil society and socialism) 
(Tokyo, 1969), Kiyoaki Hirata, Keizaigaku to rekishi ninshiki (Economics and the philoso 
phy of history) (Tokyo, 1971). Cited in John Keane, Civil society: Old images, new visions 
(Cambridge, U.K., 1998), 12-13. 
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in its interaction with other sectors such as the bureaucracy and the corporate com 
munity. The Elementary Particle Theory Group and its like can be considered 
forerunners of, or models for, civil society organizations. But many of the prewar 
and wartime institutions, namely the bureaucracy, continued largely unchanged or 
even strengthened their role in the postwar period. 
The physicists contributed to the formation of a postwar public sphere, a place 
where all citizens could discuss matters of mutual interest, especially issues relat 
ing to science, but also a place where scientists could pursue their own political 
goals.104 The relationship between scientific expertise and public policy was some 
times confusing, with scientists actively seeking to make their expertise relevant 
and further their own political aims. There were tensions between the perception 
of physicists as an interest group and spokesmen for a public good. The push, 
especially in the mid-to-late 1960s, for the establishment of an accelerator facility 
that would eventually be called the KEK High Energy Physics Laboratory, stretched 
the notion that they could simultaneously be both. 
The physicists did not deny the utilitarian ends, to which science could be put, 
but in contrast to the position of big business and the bureaucracy, they lobbied for 
the creation of a domestic research and development capability rather than reli 
ance on technology transfers from overseas. 
The reorganization of science in contemporary Japan 
The lives of these seven physicists provide an understanding of only part of the 
policymaking picture. Nonetheless, they allow a representative picture of the dy 
namics and conflict between different elements of what, to date, has been the Japa 
nese research and development policymaking structure. In retrospect, emphasis on 
the commercial exploitation of foreign technology may have led to economic suc 
cess and rapid modernization, but it has served to weaken fundamental research 
and has prevented the Japanese from fully embracing the Western vision of sci 
ence. While it has not prevented Japan from taking the lead in certain technolo 
gies, it is now seen as hampering further technological development.105 Japan thus 
faces the challenge of building for itself a new vision of science with different 
priorities. 
The contemporary call for creativity in science and technology and the concur 
rent emergence of civil society have the potential to recast the "role" of scientists. 
What is different is that there is no longer an understanding that those who pro 
duce knowledge deserve a special role in politics. Thus in closing I outline some 
104. This idea is discussed in Arthur Edwards, "Scientific expertise and policymaking: The 
intermediary role of the public sphere," Science and public policy, 26:3 (June 1999), 163 
170. 
105. See for example, Christopher Freeman, "Japan: A new national system of innova 
tion?", in Giovanni Dosi et al., eds., Technical change and economic theory (London, 1988), 
330-348, on 345-346. 
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exciting changes that may lead to the reorganization of science in Japan and the 
realization, in transmuted form, of some of the things the physicists called for. 
In the 1990s, many politicians and members of the public called for reform of 
the political system. Japan is currently undergoing that transformation. It has be 
come clear to the Japanese that public good and national interest (as determined by 
politicians and bureaucrats) do not necessarily converge. The physicists discussed 
in this essay found this out firsthand. By examining the causes and enactment of 
recent administrative reforms in Japan we can also better understand the political 
context in which those physicists worked. 
Recent years have seen widespread public uproar in Japan over a number of 
controversies, including an attempted cover-up of an accident at a fast breeder 
reactor in 1995, the world's worst case of dioxin contamination,106 lack of public 
consultation in the construction of Narita Airport,107 and a medical care system 
that has been slow to protect the rights of individuals.108 On September 30,1999, 
Japan's worst nuclear accident occurred at a uranium-processing plant in Tokai 
mura, Ibaraki prefecture. These controversies have highlighted the inadequacies 
of the bureaucracy, the overly close ties with the private sector known as "crony 
capitalism," and the inability of government to fulfill its responsibilities. Indeed, 
the relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party, bureaucracy, and big busi 
ness with which the physicists long grappled, is now viewed as Japan's central 
problem rather than the secret of its success. The end of continuous LDP rule in 
1993 and changing political landscape can be interpreted as breakdown in the sys 
tem of governance that oversaw Japan's postwar modernization. Recent contro 
versies have taught politicians to be more receptive to the needs of the people. 
With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the 1955 political regime that placed 
the LDP in continual power, the increasing pluralism of Japanese society, and greater 
individual awareness of rights, the Japanese have even been prompted to recon 
sider the postwar Constitution.109 Japan is experiencing another crisis (an eco 
nomic recession), and the nation, with a stronger civil society in place, is once 
again trying to reinvent itself. This time, Japan looks better placed to meet the 
needs of its citizens, and the citizenry is drawing a less fuzzy line between itself 
and the state. 
The reorganization of the bureaucracy and reduction in the number of minis 
tries has the potential to reduce the hierarchy and create a space in which NGOs 
(non-governmental organizations) and individuals can play a greater part in work 
106. Japan Times Staff, "Obuchi urges quick dioxin review," Japan times international (1 
15 Mar 1999), 5; Mick Corliss, "Panel urges stricter dioxin standards," Japan times inter 
national (16-30 June 1999), 15. 
107. Michael Millett, "Sell? You gotta be dreamin'," Sydney morning herald (22 May 
1999), 22. 
108. "Pill for Japan," Courier mail (3 June, 1999), 19; Low, Nakayama, and Yoshioka (ref. 1). 
109. Keizo Nabeshima, "A political taboo is shattered," Japan times international (16-31 
Aug 1999), 18. 
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ing for the common good.110 The Ministry of Finance has lost some of its power 
and will be renamed the Treasury Ministry. The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
will merge with the Ministry of Labor. And the new Ministry of Education, Sci 
ence and Technology will combine the Ministry of Education and the Science and 
Technology Agency.111 Along with recent Freedom of Information legislation,112 
the passing of an environmental impact assessment law, and the implementation 
of a new framework to encourage voluntary associations, these new arrangements 
and other reforms, to be put into place by 2001, may mean that the interests of the 
public receive higher priority. 
There are strong parallels between the rise of civil society in Japan today and 
what physicists were seeking to achieve immediately after the war. The difference 
is that Japan is now an affluent society, more concerned by questions of quality of 
life than was the case fifty years ago. The new standards of accountability that the 
Japanese are seeking in many aspects of science, technology, and medical care 
today remind us of the concerns of physicists regarding policymaking, especially 
for atomic energy. 
110. "Final reform report trims government to 13 entities," Japan times (4 Dec 1997), 1. 
Kan Kato suggests that the changes may only be superficial. See Kan Kato, "Administra 
tive reform: Government reorganization a sham," Japan times international (16-30 June 
1999), 19. 
111. Kyodo News, "What's in a name change?", Japan times international (16-30 Apr 
1999), 10. 
112. Kyodo News, "Freedom-of-information bill wins Diet approval," Japan times inter 
national (1-15 May 1999), 6. 
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